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Established in 1966, the Assembly
Office of Research (AOR) brings
together legislators, scholars, research
experts and interested parties from with-
in and outside the legislature to conduct
extensive studies regarding problems
facing the state.
Under the director of the Assembly's
bipartisan Committee on Policy
Research, AOR investigates current sate
issues and publishes reports which
include long-term policy recommenda-
tions. Such investigative projects often
result in legislative action, usually in the
form of bills.
AOR also processes research
requests from Assemblymembers.
Results of these short-term research pro-
jects are confidential unless the request-
ing legislators authorize their release.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Mortgaging the Thrift Industry: A
History of Savings and Loans (February
1990). This AOR report discusses the
historical development of the thrift
industry in the United States, emphasiz-
ing California's state-chartered savings
and loans during the late 1970s and the
1980s; highlights the findings of federal
and state regulators who examined
insolvent savings and loan associations
from the mid-1980s to the present; and
offers policy options and recommenda-
tions to assist state legislators and other
interested parties in addressing
California's thrift problems.
According to the report, during the
nineteenth century, the public's desire
for institutions to finance home mort-
gages and provide safe depositories for
personal savings led to the establish-
ment of cooperative savings societies
and mutual savings banks, the forerun-
ners of today's savings and loan, or
thrift, industry. There was no govern-
ment support or supervision for these
early savings and loans for more than a
century. However, a number of unsound
"national" savings and loans were
formed in the late 1880s and early
1890s, leading to the creation of an
industry organization to set standards.
That organization is now known as the
United States League of Savings
Institutions. By 1928, some states had
begun to regulate their savings and
loans, resulting in an industry governed
by a hodgepodge of state regulations.
Following the market crash of 1928
and the general economic collapse that
followed, savings and loans found them-
selves with massive holdings of repos-
sessed devalued property. Depositors
lost faith in the system, and there were
runs on both savings and loan associa-
tions and banks. Because there was no
deposit insurance to protect savers and
no system of home loan banks to pro-
vide emergency liquidity to thrifts, more
than 1,700 failed, and depositors lost
more than $200 million.
Congress responded by approving
three major acts: the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act of 1932, the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1934, and the
National Housing Act of 1934. Each of
these acts was aimed at resuscitating the
thrift industry, and each resulted in clos-
er regulation of that industry.
During the period from 1947-60,
total assets of the savings and loan
industry grew from $10 billion to more
than $60 billion. Interest rates paid to
savings depositors in this post-war era
were low, generally 2-2.5%, and mort-
gage interest was 5-5.5% and stable. In
the 1960s, the industry experienced
increased competition, higher interest
rates, and declining earnings or return
on assets. The 1970s brought inflation,
as well as a significant increase in the
number of rules governing savings and
loan lending practices.
In California, perhaps the landmark
action of the 1970s affecting the thrift
industry was the 1978 state Supreme
Court decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America. The court held that private
lenders in California could not use "due-
on-sale" clauses in loan agreements to
prevent purchasers of residential real
estate from assuming mortgages at old,
low interest rates. The thrift industry
complained that the decision bound
them to old mortgages yielding 8-9%
interest while the national prime lending
rate was at its highest level in history.
By the early 1980s, savings and loans
had to pay depositors 16% or more to
keep their money flowing into the indus-
try.
In 1982, the United States Supreme
Court held that Wellenkamp did not
apply to federally-chartered thrifts. Later
that same year, Congress gave both
state-chartered financial institutions and
private individuals the authority to
enforce due-on-sale clauses. However,
between 1978 and 1982, several hun-
dred savings and loan institutions went
out of business or merged with other
institutions because they were caught in
the interest rate squeeze.
Congress attempted to respond to this
situation by passing the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980. The Act (1) pro-
vided authority for all thrifts and
commercial banks to offer interest-bear-
ing checking accounts; (2) allowed
state-chartered thrifts to convert to fed-
eral charters; (3) raised the federal
deposit insurance from $40,000 per
account per person or legal entity to
$100,000; and (4) eliminated the ceil-
ings on interest rates that thrifts could
pay depositors on various types of
accounts. Acting on this last grant of
authority, many thrifts paid depositors
higher interest rates to keep them from
withdrawing their savings to invest in
more attractive financial instruments.
However, because many of these thrifts
were still locked into long-term, fixed
rate mortgage loans that provided the
thrifts with less income than they need-
ed to pay depositors, almost 500 thrifts
failed across the country between 1980
and 1983.
A variety of congressional acts dur-
ing the early 1980s resulted in the sub-
stantial deregulation of federal-chartered
thrifts. As a result, large numbers of
California's state-chartered thrifts began
converting to federal charters. To stem
the tide of such conversions, the
California League of Savings Institu-
tions, then the California Savings and
Loan League, asked for legislative
action. In 1982, the state legislature
removed most investment restrictions on
state-chartered thrifts.
The new investment powers and
deregulation measures at both the feder-
al and state levels had an immediate
impact on the industry nationwide, and
they proved to be a very mixed blessing.
Thrifts using the new powers prospered
if they employed experienced managers
familiar with the risks and benefits of
commercial real estate lending, invest-
ment in commercial and residential
property, equity securities, consumer
loans, and a variety of financial instru-
ments available in the secondary market.
But the thrifts with inexperienced or
shortsighted managers who did not
understand either the inherent risks or
the sophisticated and often high-risk
devices used to hedge against those risks
did not fare well.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Califor-
nia began to stiffen its regulatory
authority over savings and loans, and
rigorous new financial standards have
recently been imposed by federal legis-
lation. However, serious damage has
already occurred. By January 1989, an
estimated 500 of the nation's 3,000 sav-
ings and loans were considered insol-
vent. The Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation's (FSLIC) insur-
ance fund went broke in 1986 bailing
out these insolvent thrifts.
In August 1989, the Financial
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 10, Nos. 2 & 3 (Spring/Summer 1990)
INTERNAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF AGENCIES
Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enhancement Act (FIRREA) was enact-
ed to re-fund the insolvent FSLIC. This
legislation also raises capital require-
ments, gives federal regulators broader
authority over state-chartered thrifts,
and restricts direct real estate and equity
investments by the state-chartered por-
tion of the industry. (See CRLR Vol. 9,
No. 4 (Fall 1989) pp. 99-100 for back-
ground information.)
AOR's report noted that the most
common problems facing insolvent or
poorly capitalized savings and loan
institutions today can be placed into the
following categories: (1) bad loans; (2)
overreliance on volatile funding in the
form of large brokered deposits; (3)
insider abuse and fraud; (4) failure of
management o correct problems identi-
fied by the regulators; and (5) poor
recordkeeping that often masks risky
deals.
In response to these problems and in
light of current re-regulation of the
industry, AOR made the following rec-
ommendations:
-the state legislature should set loan-
to-value ratios for real estate loans
secured by unimproved real property;
-the state legislature should amend
existing law to require a thrift to inspect
any property for which a savings and
loan institution proposes to originate a
loan of $1 million or more;
-the legislature should amend the
California Financial Code to restrict
transactions among savings and loans,
their holding companies, subsidiaries,
and affiliates;
-the California Savings and Loan
Commissioner should be required to
report by March 1, 1991, on whether the
FIRREA's exceptions to national bank
lending restrictions provide adequate
protections to state-chartered savings
and loan depositors and shareholders;
-the legislature should restrict the use
of brokered deposits by state-chartered
savings and loans; and
-the legislature should reinstate a
multiple stockholder requirement for
new state-chartered savings and loans in
California, together with a share per-
centage limit for any single stockholder.
Return of the Medfly: The Battles
Continues (March 1990). According to
this AOR report, in the early 1980s, the
crop-destroying Mediterranean fruit fly
(Medfly) caused a major infestation in
northern California, particularly in
Santa Clara County. In response, the
California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA) attacked the pest
with limited pesticide applications from
the ground, removal of potentially
infested backyard fruit, and release of
millions of sterile Medflies. Despite
such efforts, the infestation worsened.
Aerial spraying of the infested area with
the pesticide malathion began in July
1981 and was completed in September
1982. About 900,000 acres in 44 cities
within 8 counties were sprayed with
malathion. The cost of the 1981-82
Medfly eradication program was
approximately $96 million.
According to the report, CDFA
acknowledges that the state found at
least one Medfly every year after this
major infestation, except in 1983 and
1985. In 1987, 44 adult Medflies were
found in Los Angeles County, compared
to 4 adult Medflies found in the same
county in 1980. Because of the increas-
ing number of Medflies discovered
within the state during the late 1980s,
the report criticized CDFA for not
responding more quickly to address and
prevent the potentially serious problem
of reinfestation.
Since mid-1989, and possibly due to
CDFA's inaction, the state has been
fighting another Medfly war, this time in
southern California. (See CRLR Vol. 10,
No. 1 (Winter 1990) pp. 118-19 for
background information.) During the
summer of 1989, CDFA captured 40
Medflies in the Los Angeles area. In
August, CDFA applied a single aerial
spraying of malathion to the area and,
several days later, released sterile
Medflies. In September, CDFA claimed
that eradication was complete.
However, since that time, 249 adult
Medflies and an unknown number of
Medfly larvae at 27 sites have been cap-
tured in 45 cities in southern California.
Aerial spraying of malathion has esca-
lated to an area in excess of 500 square
miles in southern California.
Following the first infestation, then-
Governor Edmund Brown established a
Pest Response Task Force, to ensure that
critical lessons learned during the 1980-
82 Medfly infestation were not forgotten
and to guarantee prompt control of
future emergency pest problems. The
task force recommended that Califor-
nia's defense lines be strengthened, that
exclusion and prevention be an ongoing
priority, and that a systematic and ongo-
ing program of research support be
established to aid in the battle.
According to AOR, however,
Californians may not have learned this
lesson. Research projects to fill Medfly
biology and ecology data gaps are not
being funded. CDFA has failed to fund
important Medfly research projects.
Instead of heeding the task force recom-
mendations, CDFA appears to focus
funding on research to build a better
Medfly trap or to better eradicate the
Medfly once it is found in the state. A
review of CDFA budget data for the
period 1980-81 through 1990-91 reveals
that eradication programs have received
far more resources than prevention pro-
grams, receiving funding approximately
225-650% higher than prevention pro-
grams.
According to AOR, an emphasis on
prevention programs over eradication
programs would alleviate the adverse
effects that many eradication pesticides
cause. Malathion, for example, may pro-
duce the following reactions in humans:
skin rashes, irritation of the eyes, nose,
or throat, or a flare-up of asthma in
known asthmatics.
AOR recommends that California
reorganize existing governmental
research activities and abolish the
existing Medfly/exotic pest Science
Advisory Panel within CDFA, and that
the legislature create an independent
Institute for Exotic Pest Research. In
conjunction with the creation of this
Institute, the legislature should do the
following:
-set a research agenda which focuses
on prevention, but not to the exclusion
of exploring better methods of
eradication as well;
-appropriate all state funds currently
appropriated to CDFA and the
University of California for exotic pest-
related research to the Institute for
research projects;
-provide advice to CDFA, county
agricultural commissioners, and farmers
regarding exotic pest prevention and
detection activities; and
-direct the Institute to prepare regu-
larly scheduled reports to the Governor
and the legislature on the status of state-
funded exotic pest research efforts.
A Closer Look At The Doggie In The
Window: A Survey of Pet Stores and
Veterinarians in California (April 1990)
presents statistical information regard-
ing the number and origin of puppies
transported into California for sale by
pet stores, as well as information regard-
ing those pet shop puppies in need of
medical attention following purchase.
Bills introduced during recent legislative
sessions have attempted to place con-
trols on the interstate shipment of pup-
pies into California. Debate on these
bills has focused on the conditions under
which puppies are bred and transported
to California, and the resultant incidence
of allegedly sick and genetically defec-
tive puppies being sold by pet stores.
In preparing this report, AOR sent
questionnaires to 1,252 veterinarians in
26 cities, as well as 268 pet stores in
those same cities. However, only 175
valid veterinarian surveys were returned
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to AOR, and only 54 pet stores served
as the pet store data base. Also, district
attorneys representing each of the 26
cities, humane societies, and better busi-
ness bureaus were contacted and asked
to enumerate complaints they had
received or actions they had taken relat-
ed to pet stores selling sick puppies.
Results of the surveys include the
following:
-Veterinarians responding to the
questionnaire indicated that during
1988, 8,988 pet store puppies received
treatment after purchase.
-The most common ailments among
pet store-purchased puppies were upper
respiratory disease and gastrointestinal
parasitism.
-Of the puppies treated, 48.6% were
identified as incubating a disease or sick
at the time of purchase.
-Over half (52%) of the puppies
treated incurred $50-$150 in treatment
costs, and 26.7% of the puppies treated
incurred $151-$300 in treatment costs.
-Although 51 of the 54 pet stores
responding indicated that puppies were
sold under warranty, approximately 39%
of veterinarians responding to the sur-
vey noted that none of the costs for
treating pet store purchased puppies
were covered by warranties from pet
stores.
-Puppies from out of state accounted
for the single largest source of sick pup-
pies-4,046 (45%) of the 8,988 sick
puppies treated for illness by veterinari-
ans.
-The pet shops surveyed noted that
69.8% of puppies sold are acquired from
out-of-state breeders.
California Children, California
Families: Educating Minority Students
in California (April 1990) addresses
ways in which California can reform
and/or restructure its educational system
to respond more effectively to the needs
of its minority students. The report
develops an academic profile of those
schools principally serving minority stu-
dents, examines factors contributing to
the differences in achievement between
low- and high-performing schools,
addresses issues of resource allocation,
and makes several policy recommenda-
tions for addressing some of the more
critical issues highlighted by the study.
The report noted that gains have been
made in the achievement of black and
Hispanic students ince the implementa-
tion of various educational reform
efforts five years ago. However, there
continues to be a persistent and signifi-
cant gap between the performance of
white and Asian students and the perfor-
mance of black and Hispanic students in
California public schools. The differ-
ences are extremely acute when compar-
ing the performance of schools serving
predominantly black and/or Hispanic
students with schools serving predomi-
nantly white students.
Also, schools serving high percent-
ages of black and Hispanic students
have significantly larger average enroll-
ments than schools serving high per-
centages of white students. This is par-
ticularly true for Hispanic students at all
grade levels.
AOR noted that current statewide
practice requires that fiscal data be col-
lected using the school district as the
unit of analysis rather than the individu-
al school site. Therefore, it is not possi-
ble to determine whether actual resource
differences exist among schools serving
primarily black and Hispanic students as
compared to schools serving primarily
white students.
Finally, AOR found that no over-
whelming quantitative data exist which
demonstrate the factors contributing to
the differences between the highest- and
lowest-performing schools serving pre-
dominantly minority students.
As recommendations, AOR first sug-
gested that policies for improving low-
performing schools serving primarily
black and Hispanic students should
include reducing the size of the school
unit. This could be accomplished either
by designing smaller individual schools
or adopting a "school within a school"
concept.
AOR next recommended that expen-
diture data be collected so it is possible
to determine per pupil expenditures by
school site. The data to be collected
should be standardized statewide, using
expenditure categories which are easily
understood by the public. The actual
design of the school level data system
should consider input from a group of
local administrator and teacher groups.
School personnel at the school site level
should receive training and assistance
from the school district in order to
ensure that data collection is uniform
and does not pose an excessive burden
on site personnel.
Finally, AOR noted that continued
investigation is needed to assist schools
serving minority students in identifying
the critical factors involved in making
significant improvements in student per-
formance. A number of projects
designed to assist such schools are cur-
rently underway. Issues uch as teacher
collegiality, community support ser-
vices, student participation levels, staff
development, partnerships with private
industry and institutions of higher edu-
cation, decisionmaking models, and
incentives for innovative strategies
should be considered when examining
schools which are making significant
improvements in minority student
achievement.
SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH
Director: Elisabeth Kersten
(916) 445-1727
Established and directed by the
Senate Committee on Rules, the Senate
Office of Research (SOR) serves as the
bipartisan, strategic research and plan-
ning unit for the Senate. SOR produces
major policy reports, issue briefs, back-
ground information on legislation and,
occasionally, sponsors symposia and
conferences.
Any Senator or Senate committee
may request SOR's research, briefing
and consulting services. Resulting
reports are not always released to the
public.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Regulation vs. Practice: A Review of
the California Department of Food and
Agriculture's Pesticide Registration
Process (February 1990). SOR
reviewed the California Department of
Food and Agriculture's (CDFA) analysis
of pesticide products registered for sale
in 1987. The review indicates severe
problems with the current registration
process, with the following principal
findings:
-numerous pesticide products lacking
adequate warnings for consumers have
been registered for sale in California;
-recommendations by CDFA's scien-
tists questioning the safety of pesticide
products have been repeatedly disre-
garded over the last four years, and
CDFA scientists have accused non-sci-
entists of altering documents, disregard-
ing policies, and distorting legal man-
dates; and
-CDFA has adopted policies and
practices circumventing regulatory
requirements that require full testing for
acute health effects of pesticides.
CDFA is charged with protecting
Californians from the toxic properties of
pesticide products. In order to accom-
plish this task, pesticides must be regis-
tered by CDFA before they may be sold
in the state. SOR reviewed CDFA's reg-
istration of pesticide products between
March and December 1987. This report
documents that during this time twenty
products were approved for sale without
regard for the recommendations of
CDFA scientists. This number repre-
sents 14% of the products evaluated by
CDFA's Medical Toxicology Branch
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